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METROPOLITAN GROWTH POLICIES AND
NEW HOUSING SUPPLY: EVIDENCE FROM
AUSTRALIA’S CAPITAL CITIES
Ralph B. McLaughlin
Lecturer, School of Natural and Built Environments, University of South Australia, GPO
Box 2471, Adelaide, South Australia 5001, Australia.
ABSTRACT:
This paper empirically examines the relationship between house price
change, metropolitan growth policies, and new housing supply in Australia‟s five major
capital cities. Our hypothesis suggests capital cities with tighter regulations on new
development will have fewer housing starts and price elasticities than those in lessregulated markets. The empirical procedure used in this paper utilises the Urban Growth
Model of Housing Supply developed in Mayer and Somerville (2000a and 2000b) and
employed in Zabel and Patterson (2006) by using quarterly data on housing approvals and
house prices from 1996-2010. Data on metropolitan growth policies in Australia is
borrowed from Hamnett and Kellett (2007). Preliminary findings indicate that new
housing supply in Australian capital cities is elastic to housing price changes, as a one per
cent increase in prices leads to an approximately 4-6 per cent increase in housing
approvals over five quarters. While this indicates a properly functioning housing market,
the estimated elasticity is about a third of other developed countries, such as the United
States. Furthermore, the use of established growth policies, such as urban growth
boundaries and urban consolidation, appears to have a greater impact on new housing
approvals than adoption of new-style growth policies, such as development corporations
and infrastructure levies. However, both types of policies decrease new housing supply.

1. INTRODUCTION
Much scholarly work on Australian housing markets centres on housing price
trends and their determinants (Abelson, 1994; Maher, 1994; Bourassa and
Hendershot, 1995; Murphy and Harley, 2003; Berry and Dalton, 2004; Abelson,
Joyeux, Milunovich, and Chung, 2005), while relatively little work examines
supply-side dynamics (Williams, 2000; Yates and Wulff, 2000; Yates, 2001;
Wood, 2003; Berry, 2003). Furthermore, few studies empirically examine
supply-side responses to increases in housing demand (Yates and Wulff, 2000).
This is surprising, given that recent theoretical and empirical evidence suggests
low housing supply elasticity may play an important role in the emergence of
market bubbles and decreased housing affordability (Berry and Dalton, 2004;
Glaeser, 2006; Glaser, Gyourko, and Saiz, 2008).
Low housing supply elasticity could result from a number of factors. In
Australia, two primary culprits are oft-blamed: land market intervention, and
developer land banking. The former is usually targeted by representatives of the
housing industry (Day, 2006), while the latter targeted by opponents of neoliberalism (Gleeson and Coiacetto, 2007; Beer, Kierans, and Pieters, 2007). Land
market interventions are said to lower supply elasticity by restricting the pace
and intensity of new development, while private land banking is blamed for
reducing elasticity through monopolistic private ownership of large amounts of
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developable land.
In response to the perceived problems of private land banking and “economic
surplus” of the development industry, the Whitlam Government established the
Land Commission Program (LCP) in the early 1970s, and state governments in
Australia formed public land corporations for the purpose of regulating the
acquisition and release of land supply (Stretton, 1970; Troy, 1979; Gleeson and
Coiacettto, 2007). Approximately twenty years later, urban consolidation and
other metropolitan growth policies were hallowed across the country as solutions
to problems of environmental and social sustainability. Both efforts involved
removing large amounts of developable land around Australia‟s capital cities by
different means: public land commissions achieved this by purchasing land from
the private market, while metropolitan-wide policies preserved land through the
use of various land regulations, such as urban growth boundaries, urban service
limits, and non-urban zoning. Much criticism concerning large increases in
Australian house prices have been directed towards these two efforts. However,
there is little empirical evidence to verify housing price effects of such programs.
This is perhaps enhanced by the complex nature of housing prices themselves.
This paper takes an alternative approach to testing this argument by
empirically examining the cumulative impacts of metropolitan growth policies
on new housing supply. Specifically, we address three interrelated questions:
(1) What is the general supply elasticity of new housing in Australia over
the past 15 years?
(2) Has utilisation of strong metropolitan growth policies affected the
supply of new housing units? and
(3) Do impacts of such policies vary between older „established” policies
vs. newer “innovative” policies?
The following section reviews past and recent trends in housing studies and
conditions in Australia, and lays out the advantages of using the urban growth
model of housing supply for evaluations of metropolitan planning policies.
Section 3 describes a theoretical and empirical model of new housing supply
based on the urban growth model; section 4 discusses results from the empirical
analysis; and section 5 concludes with policy recommendations and caveats.
2. THE AUSTRALIAN HOUSING MARKET
Over the past 40 years, housing issues in Australia have been a central focus
of academics, politicians, industry players, and the general public alike. Much of
this focus has centred on the interplay of government and urban planning
policies, neo-liberalism, and housing affordability. Specifically, the major debate
on housing affordability festers between government interventionists and neoliberals. On the left, proponents of government intervention argue the housing
market, left to its own device, will lead to over-speculation, market instability,
and generally unaffordable housing via the monopolistic tendencies of land and
housing developers. On the right, neo-liberals argue urban planning policies
reduce affordability by excessive restrictions on the supply of developable land
through land market intervention, public land agencies, and high taxation. Both
arguments have theoretical merit, although little empirical evidence exists to
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vindicate either perspective. This lack of evidence is the primary motivation for
this study.
Urban economic theory suggests that, ceteris paribus, a reduction in the
supply of developable land does not unambiguously lead to higher housing
prices. This should be the same for any supply reduction, regardless of whether it
originates from public agencies or monopolistic land speculators. However, a
reduction in the supply of developable land must lead to higher land prices. And
although land and housing prices are certainly correlated, an increase in land
prices does not necessarily lead to higher housing prices. This is because land
and capital are substitutable: when faced with higher land costs and a downward
sloping demand curve, developers should theoretically use less land per housing
unit and built more housing units per hectare of land. This substitution should
occur at a rate that offsets the increase in land price. Thus, the end result of a
supply-induced increase in land prices should be smaller housing units, but not
necessarily more expensive housing units. This is the desired mechanism of
urban consolidation efforts: to increase sustainable development and preserve
open space by limiting the supply of developable land, while allowing
developers and other government programs to increase the density of the built
environment and housing choice, respectively.
However in a socio-political landscape, existing residents are often opposed
to increases in density within their communities. As such, local development
plans and zoning codes typically reflect local not-in-my-back-yard (NIMBY)
attitudes through the use of density and minimum lot size restrictions. As a
result, the goals of increasing housing affordability and sustainability through
urban consolidation policies can be at odds with local desires of urban form.
Thus, what often results from initial efforts of urban consolidation are heavily
regulated land markets with tight density restrictions on new development, both
from state government reductions of new green field sites and local council
density restrictions on existing brown field sites. In such a scenario, developers
are prevented from making an efficient land/capital substitution, and the end
result must be an increase in both land and housing prices.
To complicate matters, comprehensive planning of land and housing markets
can result in housing price increases from two independent market effects: a
decrease in supply, due to restrictive zoning and development plans, but also
from demand increases, which arises from improvements in the quality of the
built environment. As a result, analyses of planning policies and house prices
must take into account these separate effects. Failing to do so could misattribute
the specific effects of a given policy. While quantifying the stock of housing
supply is relatively straightforward, quantification of improvements in the
quality of the built environment is quite difficult. Only a handful of studies
address the prospective welfare gains from comprehensive planning schemes
(Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002 and 2005), and even fewer empirical studies have
attempted to estimate demand-side price effects (Egbu, Olomolaiye, and
Gameson, 2007; Ihlanfeldt, 2009).
Despite this empirical challenge, academic analyses of house prices (Abelson
and Chung, 2005), housing policies (Berry and Dalton, 2004), and their
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determinants (Abelson, Joyeux, Milunovich, and Chung, 2005) remain popular
in Australian academic literature. This comes as no surprise, since recent house
price appreciation in Australia has topped the list of developed countries (The
Economist, 2003; Abelson and Chung, 2005). Even in the face of housing bubble
concerns in the earl-mid 2000s (Berry and Dalton, 2004), house price indices
continued to climb for all Australian cities. Furthermore, the robustness of the
Australian housing market continued during the onset of the global financial
crisis.
Figures 1 and 2 show the Residex quarterly housing price index for the five
major capital cities from 1993-2010 for homes and units, respectively. The
picture for both detached homes and apartment units are similar: price
appreciation was relatively smooth to the late 1990s, but rapid increases took
hold in Sydney and Melbourne, followed by Brisbane in the early 2000s and
soon after in Adelaide and Perth. While these figures show rapid increases, they
do not take into account increases in income and inflation. Figures 3 and 4 better
captures this, as they show increases in the price index relative to increases in
weekly wages from the previous quarter, for houses and units, respectively.
These figures show a less pronounced price increase compared to Figure 1 and 2.
Even so, the price growth of housing relative to income increased dramatically
from the late 1990s to the mid 2000s, followed by another sharp increase from
2006-2007. Income increases gained significant ground on house prices only for
two brief periods in the late 2000s. A simple comparison of house prices changes
with average weekly wage changes between 1994-2010 best shows this
discrepancy. For Adelaide, income grew by 72% while house prices grew by
259%; income in Brisbane grew by 96% and house prices by 250%; income in
Melbourne increased by 72% and house prices by 294%; income in Perth rose by
102% and house prices by 323%; and income in Sydney grew 77% and house
prices by 208%. Clearly, more than just increases in disposable income are
driving house price appreciation.
But what other factors might be driving these large price escalations? This
has been a matter of debate in the academic literature, and scholarly evidence
ranges from descriptive and speculative (Berry and Dalton, 2004), to inferential
and inconclusive (Abelson et al, 2005). The speculative evidence suggests a
number of causes for price appreciation, such as: declines in interest rates,
increases in speculative residential investment, changes in land use regulation,
tax subsidies for homeownership, and long term economic and demographic
growth (Berry and Dalton, 2004; Abelson and Chung, 2005). The inferential
evidence gives clues to which of these factors has played the most significant
role (Abelson et al, 2005). For house price changes between 1970 and 2003, the
largest impact was from changes in mortgage rates, where one point decrease in
quarterly interest rates has historically increased house prices by 5.4 per cent.
Income also plays a significant role, with a one per cent change in per capita
income leading to a 1.7 per cent increase in prices. Most pertinent to the
empirical approach in our study is the impact of housing supply. Abelson et al.
(2005) estimate that a one per cent increase in the Australian housing stock leads
to a 3.6 per cent decrease in housing prices. This finding suggests that the
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Figure 1. House Price Index for Homes, 1993-2010

Figure 2. House Price Index for Units, 1993-2010
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Figure 3. HPI-Income Ratio for Homes, 1994-2010

Figure 4. HPI-Income Ratio for Units, 1994-2010
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addition of new housing supply could play a significant role in moderating
escalating house prices. Furthermore, supply factors could play an even greater
role today, as the estimates of Abelson et al. (2005) were computed from data
only up to 2003 – well before the most recent run-up in housing prices.
While studies of Australian housing prices are quite abundant, empirical
analyses of supply are practically non-existent. This is by no means limited to the
Australian context, as few scholarly efforts have addressed the theoretical or
empirical determinants of new housing supply. The few existing studies
primarily focus on determinants of the size of the housing stock, such as
population, income, and household size, while very few empirically estimate
supply-side elasticities. Moreover, an empirical model of new housing starts was
only recently developed (Mayer and Somerville, 2000a) and tested empirically
(Mayer and Somerville, 2000b; Zabel and Patterson, 2006). But no known use of
this model has been employed to the Australian case.
The advantages of using empirical models of housing supply elasticities are
threefold. First, as described above, planning policies can influence prices by
reducing supply and increasing demand. Bifurcating these two effects
empirically is a difficult, if not impossible task. Using supply elasticities avoids
this problem. Second, estimating new supply is not as vulnerable to measurement
error as measuring housing prices. This is because house price indicators can
vary tremendously depending on method of measurement: median and average
prices can shift depending on the quality and quantity of homes sold during any
period, and the quality of home sales data can vary drastically between sources
because there is no standard definition of what constitutes housing prices
(Abelson and Chung, 2005; Abelson and Joyeux, 2007). Alternatively, data on
new housing approvals (which represents new supply) consists of
straightforward counts on the number of new permits in a given area, and is
reliably available from the ABS on a monthly basis. As such, we choose to
estimate the impacts of metropolitan planning policies on new housing supply,
rather than prices.
3. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL MODEL OF HOUSING SUPPLY
3.1 A Theoretical Narrative of New Housing Supply
For purposes of this paper, the Mayer and Somerville (2000b) model of new
housing supply is ideal as its conceptual underpinnings are based in urban
growth theory. Urban growth theory postulates that the determinants of urban
growth are best measured by changes, as opposed to levels, of such factors. In
other words, the existing state of the universe is best predicted by shifts in the
previous state of the universe, rather than the previous universe itself. For new
housing supply, this is characterised by housing price changes as a superior
predictor of new housing units compared to housing price levels. The following
paragraphs describe the theoretical intuition.
Imagine a large city that is neither growing nor shrinking, but rather exists in
a steady-state with no major changes to population, income, or transportation
costs. In this hypothetical city, housing prices reflect the overall wealth of city,
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the number of people bidding for different housing types, and the costs of
commuting. As it is a large city with higher than average income and number of
residents, housing and land prices are relatively high compared to other areas but
no new units are being demanded. Housing starts thus approach zero in such a
city.
Now imagine a small city where housing prices are much lower than the large
city. Suppose a one-time increase in population occurs only in the small city.
Demand for housing increases. Since housing is a complex durable good, new
supply does not occur instantaneously (or even quickly) because of inherent lags
in construction processes and planning approvals. In the short-run, house prices
increase temporarily as new households bid up the price for land and housing.
Developers take note of housing price increases and respond by building more
units. Once enough new supply is provided to satisfy demand, house prices
should fall close to pre-growth levels (though land prices will be slightly higher
on a per metre basis to reflect an increase in scarcity).
In each of these scenarios, housing price levels would not correctly predict
increases in new supply. This is because a city can be large and expensive but
also slow growing, as in the first scenario, and have relative few housing starts,
while a small and inexpensive but fast growing town could have many starts.
Price changes (increases), on the other hand, occur wherever demand shifts
(increases), regardless of existing price levels. As such, models of new housing
supply should be theoretically more robust when using price changes in place of
price levels.
In addition, a number of other geo-economic and institutional factors can
affect the provision of new housing. Geographical and geological variations in
the landscape can drastically alter construction costs. Cities in close proximity to
shipping ports and/or large sources of raw materials will have lower
constructions costs because of readily available inputs for new development,
while areas with dramatic topographical features or unstable soils have higher
constructions costs because of increased complexities in the building process.
Furthermore, policies of governments and financial institutions can affect
new housing supply. And although many of these policies are designed to
influence housing demand, such as interest rates and homeowner tax breaks,
several also affect the provision of new housing units. For example, increases in
interest rates make financing new development projects more costly, and thus
likely to reduce new residential supply. Local and state development plans also
reduce the supply of new residential units by using regulations that reduce the
intensity of new development, such as maximum density limits and minimum lot
sizes. Additionally, most new development cannot occur without proper approval
from local councils. Approval hearings can introduce delays and uncertainty into
the development process, thereby making development riskier and less likely to
occur (Mayer and Somerville, 2000b).
Thus, to avoid estimation bias, all of these aforementioned factors must be
controlled for in empirical models of housing supply. The following subsection
intimately details such a model, which is derived from Mayer and Somerville
(2000a and 2000b) and Zabel and Patterson (2006).
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3.2 The Mayer-Somerville Empirical Model of New Housing Supply
In many theoretical models of urban growth, new development occurs
instantaneously. However, as mentioned above, there are various reasons why
this is not an accurate reflection of the development process. Construction
delays, development approvals, and geo-economic anomalies may create a lag
between demand shocks and supply response. When lags exist, larger increases
in demand lead to greater short-run increases in both land and housing prices. As
a result, it is important to account for not only price changes in current periods,
but also price changes in previous periods.
The intuition is that developers, seeking to maximise profits, observe price
increases in the housing market, and respond by providing new supply over the
course of several time periods as they obtain building permits and mobilise
resources for construction. In empirical models of housing elasticities, it is
important to include an adequate number of time period lags to properly capture
the delayed impacts of price changes. Evidence from Mayer and Somerville
(2000a and 2000b) suggests that in the US, these lag periods range from three to
five quarters. However, legal, economic, and institutional conditions are different
in Australia. Although there are no known estimates of residential supply lags in
Australia, Abelson et al. (2005) estimates Australian housing market prices
adjust to equilibrium in approximately four quarters. As this estimate is similar
to the lag period in Mayer and Somerville, we employ the more conservative
structure of five quarters to allow for the possibility of longer adjustments to
prices.
In our model, the price change for each proceeding five quarters is included
as an explanatory variable of new housing supply. Specifically, we use the log of
the ratio of the house price index at time t relative to time t-1 to measure price
change. This is analogous to the change in log prices, and allows interpretation
as per cent house price change. We exclude the current quarter price change to
avoid problems of endogeneity bias. If included, bias would arise because house
prices and new housing supply are codetermined during a given time period:
changes in new supply affect price, but changes in price also affect new supply.
Excluding current quarter prices helps circumvent this problem, and is standard
practice in models of housing supply, such as Mayer and Somerville (2000b) and
Zabel and Patterson (2006).
Furthermore, appropriate measurements of prices are an equally important
matter. While many analyses of Australian housing markets use median or
average housing prices, potential bias can occur with these measurements. This
is because the distribution of homes sold at any moment is not constant. As such,
prices are best measured using a quality-constant housing price index. Several
such indices exist in Australia, and are produced from a variety of sources such
as the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), RP Data, and Residex Pty. Each of
these indices use variations of the repeat sales approach, which consist of
calculations based on price appreciations of individual homes sales. A detailed
description of the repeat sales approach can be found in Case and Shiller (1987).
We choose to use Residex‟s publicly available index for capital cities, as their
measure spans the entire universe of sales in a given quarter and is calculated
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using a unique non-revisionary approach that does not require adjustments over
time. The Residex HPI is then transformed to our housing price change variable
by calculating the percent change in HPI from the previous quarter.
In addition to housing prices, construction costs are also needed to control for
inter-spatial and inter-temporal variations in the costs of raw construction
materials. We obtain these figures from ABS‟s Producer Price Index (PPI) series
for materials used in house building. This index is available quarterly for each
capital city back to 1966. For interest rates, we use the Australian Reserve Bank
cash rate that was in place at the end of the quarter. And finally, to measure new
housing supply, we employ data on quarterly housing approvals also obtained
from the ABS for each capital city. Descriptive statistics for housing approvals,
as well as changes in construction costs, the HPI, and growth policy strength, are
shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
City
Adelaide
Brisbane
Melbourne
Perth
Sydney

Quarterly HPI
Growth Rate
Mean
SD
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02

0.02
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.02

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

1290
2624
5212
3066
2628

138.78
132.43
131.12
130.33
139.05

5.36
5.36
5.36
5.36
5.36

12
16
19
9
24

9
7
11
9
11

3
9
8
0
13

(1) Mean Quarterly New Housing Approvals
(2) Mean Quarterly Construction Cost Index
(3) Mean Quarterly Cash Rate
(4) Metropolitan Policy Strength
(5) Established Policy Strength
(6) Innovative Policy Strength
Source: HPI is available from Residex Pty; Housing approvals and construction costs
from the ABS; cash rate from the RBA; and metropolitan growth policies from Hamnett
and Kellett (2007).

Furthermore, it is certainly plausible (and likely) that a number of other
factors, both measurable and unmeasurable, could affect housing supply
elasticities. Excluding these factors could introduce omitted variable bias, and
the effects of our included variables could possibly exhibit spurious relationships
with the excluded factors. However, many of these factors are not likely to
change much over space or time, such as macroeconomic or national political
climate (constant over space) or geographical anomalies (constant over time). As
such, we choose to examine housing supply over 60 quarters (years 1996-2010)
to take advantage of panel data procedures. Panel data techniques, such as
population averaged OLS, random effects, and generalised-least-squares (GLS),
employ a series of adjustments to control for the impacts of any omitted
variables that are constant over space or time. Such techniques are described in
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detail in Wooldridge (2001) and Cameron and Travedi (2009). As our analysis is
most similar to Mayer and Somerville (2000b), we choose to closely follow their
estimation procedures, which is described in the following subsection.
3.3 Formal Model Specifications
As mentioned in the introduction, this paper seeks to answer three key
questions: (1) What is the general supply elasticity of new housing units in
Australia over the past 15 years? (2) Do strong adopters of metropolitan growth
policies affect the provision of new housing units? and (3) Does the effect differ
between established growth policies and newer, supply oriented policies? The
empirical model used here takes three different specifications to address these
questions. The model specification used to address question 1 is the most parsimonious of the three, and is nested within the other two models. It appears as:
Si,t = α + γt + β1ΔPi,t-1… β5ΔPi,t-5 + β6Ci,t + β7Ii,t + β8popi,87 + εi,t

(1)

where Si,t is the quarterly number of new housing approvals, α is the constant, Ɣt
is the quarterly dummy, ΔPi,t-q is the quarterly ratio of the house price index
(HPI) to the previous period (HPIt/HPIt-1) where q=5, Ci,t is the quarterly
construction cost index, Ii,t is quarterly RBA cash rate, popi,87 is the population
for city i in 1987 to control for city size, and εi,t is the error term.
To test for the cumulative impacts of urban metropolitan growth policies, we
employ data from Hamnett and Kellett‟s (2007) classification of metropolitan
planning tools employed in Australia‟s five largest capital cities. Their
classification scheme ranks capital cities on the both the presence and strength of
two classifications of growth policies: “Established Strategies,” which include
policies such as urban growth boundaries and public land agencies, as well as
“Recent Innovations,” such as infrastructure levies and fast-track planning
systems. A summary of their classification is reproduced in Table 2.
For the purposes of this analysis, we build a series of simple calculations of
regulatory stringency at the metropolitan level based on these two classifications.
The first measures the cumulative strength of metropolitan growth policy
adoption. This measure, labelled MP, is based on the sum of adoption strength
identified in Hamnett and Kellett, where No Policy = 0, Weak Policy = 1,
Moderate Policy = 2, and Strong Policy = 3.
For example, Adelaide scores a 12 for adoption strength, while Sydney
scores 24. While the interpretation and scale is not linear (i.e., a score of 24 is not
necessarily twice as strong as 12), we do believe it is a simple yet meaningful
step in measuring the rigidity of land and housing markets in Australia. The
cumulative model appears as:
Si,t = α + γt + β1ΔPi,t-1… β5ΔPi,t-5 + β6Ci,t + β7Ii,t + β8popi,87 + β9MPi,t + εi,t

(2)

where MP is included as an explanatory variable of new housing approvals.
Our third test of metropolitan growth policies seeks to determine whether the
impacts of “established” growth policies differ from newer “innovative” policies.
Hamnett and Kellett (2007, p. 279) describe “innovative” policies as extensions
of established policies that build upon past lessons in efforts to increase supply:
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“The preliminary review of current metropolitan planning strategies ...
suggests that it is premature to judge their likely outcomes but the trend
appears increasingly to favour supply based policies, enthusiastically backed
up by the development industry, which in its turn is expected to fund the
infrastructure required for metropolitan growth.”
Table 2. Adoption Strength of Metropolitan Growth Policies in Australia
Adelaide

Brisbane

Melbourne

Perth

Sydney

XX

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX

XX

XX

XXX

XXX

XX

X

O

X

X

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XXX

XX

O

XX

O

X

Established Policies (EP)
Activity centres
Corridor planning
Public land agency role
Urban consolidation
Urban growth boundaries
Innovative Policies (IP)
Development Corporation
Expand land supply
Fast track planning systems
Infrastructure levies
New co-ordinating authorities
Overarching strategic plan

O

O

O

O

XX

O

XX

XXX

O

XX

O

XX

XXX

O

XXX

O

XX

O

O

XXX

O

O

XX

O

XXX

XXX

XXX

O

O

O

O = No policy in place; X = Weak policy; XX = Moderate policy; XXX = Strong policy
Source: Hamnett and Kellett (2007).

So from an empirical perspective, stronger adoption of newer, “innovative”
policies should be associated with increases in housing supply. We measure the
strength of adoption of both established and innovative metropolitan growth
policies in a manner similar to our measurement of MP. To accomplish this, we
bifurcate MP into two separate measures: EP, which measures established
policies, and IP, which measures innovative policies. For example, this gives
Melbourne an EP score of 11 and an IP score of 8. Substituting EP and IP for
MP in equation 2 yields:
Si,t = α + γt + β1ΔPi,t-1… β5ΔPi,t-5
+ β6Ci,t + β7Ii,t + β8popi,87 + β9EPi,t + β10IPi,t + εi,t

(3)

We estimate all three equations using a semi-log structure by calculating the
natural logarithm of both housing approvals and the ratio of price changes. This
allows interpretation of the price change coefficients as true elasticities, where a
per cent change in housing prices leads to a per cent change in housing
approvals. All other variables are included using their original, unlogged values.
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3.4 Estimation Procedures
As the data and model structure used in this paper is similar to Mayer and
Somerville (2000a and 2000b) and Zabel and Patterson (2006), we adopt similar
estimation procedures. We estimate equations (1) to (3) using three separate
techniques: Pooled Feasible Generalised Least Squares (PFGLS), Feasible
Generalised Least Squares with heteroskedasticity and autoregressive adjusted
error terms (FGLS-HAR1), and Feasible Generalised Least Squares with
heteroskedasticity and panel-specific autoregressive adjusted error terms (FGLS
- HPSAR1).
While fixed effects and random effect models are popular procedures for
analysis of panel data, we avoid these estimators for two reasons. First, fixed
effects require the explanatory variables be heterogenous over time. Since our
models include a time-constant measure of metropolitan growth policies and
population, use of the fixed-effects model prohibits estimation of the MP, EP,
and IP variables. Second, the random effects procedure is inappropriate when
using panel data with relatively few cases and many time periods. As our data
contains only five cities over 60 quarters, we follow the recommendations of
Wooldridge (2001) and Cameron and Travedi (2009) for long, narrow panel data
and employ FGLS estimators.
The FGLS-HAR1 and FGLS-HPSAR1 estimators are preferred because they
correct for heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation. Heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation can arise when the error terms of panel data are non-constant
over space and time, respectively. While presence of heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation does not necessarily bias the coefficient estimates, the standard
errors can be skewed. To account for this, we use the FGLS-HAR1 procedure,
which uses a heteroskedastic and autoregressive error structure. Furthermore, use
of panel data is also susceptible to serial correlation of the error terms within
panels (in our case, each capital city). This occurs when error terms from one
time period are correlated with future or past time periods but vary in structure
for each city. As such, we estimate the FGLS-HPSAR1 specification, which uses
heteroskedastic and panel-specific autocorrelation adjustments for each capital
city‟s error term.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Results
Tables 3 to 5 present the regression results. Table 3 contains the results for
equation 1, which includes regression of log housing approvals on 5 quarter lags
of house price changes, constructions costs, and the current quarter ABS cash
rate. Quarterly dummies are suppressed for simplicity of presentation, and are
available from the author upon request. Column 1 contains the results from the
PFGLS model, column 2 the FGLS-HAR1 model, and column 3 the FGLSHPSAR1 model.
In the PFGLS model, the first 4 price changes are significant at below the .01
level, and suggest that a one per cent change in housing prices leads to a 5.8 per
cent increase in housing approvals over the next 4 quarters. Construction costs
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and population are insignificant, while the cash rate is significant and negative at
below the .10 level and suggests a one point increase in the cash rate decreases
new housing approvals by 31 per cent. Estimates from the FGLS-HAR1 model
are similar but more robust, with 1 per cent increase in prices exhibiting a 4 per
cent increase in approvals. Construction costs, the RBA cash rate, and
metropolitan population are all significant at below the .01 level: a one point
increase in the construction cost index and cash rate is associated with a 4 per
cent and 53 per cent decrease in new approvals, respectively, and a larger
population is associated with higher levels of new housing approvals. Results
from the FGLS-HPSAR1 specification are almost identical.
Table 3. Housing Approval Regression Results: Equation 1
Estimates

PFGLS

FGLSHAR1

FGLSHPSAR1

ln(∆Pricet-1)

1.318
(2.64)

0.637
(1.77)

0.648
(1.80)

ln(∆Pricet-2)

1.279
(2.46)

0.798
(1.90)

0.801
(1.89)

ln(∆Pricet-3)

1.158
(2.61)

0.902
(2.15)

0.956
(2.26)

ln(∆Pricet-4)

2.082
(2.22)

0.955
(2.29)

0.976
(2.32)

ln(∆Pricet-5)

1.965
(1.54)

0.751
(2.03)

0.761
(2.07)

Construction Costs

-0.022
(1.31)

-0.042
(7.07)

-0.043
(7.13)

Cash Rate

-0.307
(1.86)

-0.528
(7.57)

-0.544
(7.70)

Population

0.000
(1.47)

0.000
(6.46)

0.000
(7.84)

Observations
Prob > chi2
AR(1) Rho

285
0.001
-

285
0.000
0.869

285
0.000
-

Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of quarterly housing approvals. Coefficients
on quarterly dummies not shown – full results are available upon request from the author;
absolute values of z-scores are shown in parentheses below coefficients. Italicized, bold,
and bold italicized represent significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Table 4. Housing Approval Regression Results: Equation 2

Estimates

PFGLS

FGLSHAR1

FGLSHPSAR1

ln(∆Pricet-1)

1.318
(2.63)

0.660
(1.92)

0.701
(2.10)

ln(∆Pricet-2)

1.278
(2.47)

0.843
(2.12)

0.765
(1.97)

ln(∆Pricet-3)

1.158
(2.62)

0.844
(2.13)

0.869
(2.25)

ln(∆Pricet-4)

2.081
(2.22)

0.898
(2.27)

0.906
(2.35)

ln(∆Pricet-5)

1.964
(1.54)

0.646
(1.84)

0.621
(1.83)

Construction Costs

-0.022
(1.30)

-0.031
(5.11)

-0.032
(5.30)

Cash Rate

-0.307
(1.85)

-0.414
(5.93)

-0.432
(6.18)

Population

0.000
(3.10)

0.000
(7.84)

0.000
(7.13)

Metropolitan Policies (MP)

-0.165
(3.31)

-0.158
(6.17)

-0.155
(5.37)

Observations
Prob > chi2
AR(1) Rho

285
0.001
-

285
0.000
0.863

285
0.000
-

Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of quarterly housing approvals. Coefficients
on quarterly dummies not shown – full results are available upon request from the author;
absolute values of z-scores are shown in parentheses below coefficients. Italicized, bold,
and bold italicized represent significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.

Equation 2 includes all variables from equation 1 plus the MP variable,
which is the measure of metropolitan growth policy adoption strength; see Table
4. In the PFGLS specification, a one per cent change in prices leads to a 5.8 per
cent increase in housing approvals over the following 4 quarters. Construction
costs are again insignificant, while a one per cent increase in the RBA cash rate
significantly decreases new approvals by 30 per cent. Cities with large
populations permit significantly more new units than smaller cities. The MP
variable is significantly negative, which suggests stronger adopters of metro-
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politan growth policies have less housing approvals than weak adopters. The
effect is quite pronounced, as a one point shift in the adoption strength scale
decreases new housing approvals by 16 per cent.
Results from the FGLS-HAR1 model are also similar, and suggest a one per
cent increase in prices leads to a 3.9 per cent increase in new housing approvals,
a one point increase in the construction costs index and cash rate decreases new
approvals by 3 per cent and 41 per cent, respectively, and larger cities permit
significantly more units than smaller cities. Additionally, a one point increase in
MP is also associated with a 16 per cent decrease in new approvals. In the FGLSHPSAR1 specification, the impacts of price changes, construction costs, the cash
rate, population, and MP are virtually identical to those in the FGLS-HAR1
specification.
Table 5 reports results for equation 3. It includes all variables from equation
1 plus the EP and IP variables that measure the strength of established policy
adoption and innovative policy adoption respectively. In the PFGLS
specification, a one per cent increase in prices is associated with a 4.51 per cent
increase in new housing approvals. Construction costs are insignificant, while a
one point increase in the cash rate decreases new construction by 31 per cent,
and larger cities approve significantly more units than smaller cities. Both EP
and IP significantly decrease new housing supply, as a one unit increase in the
strength of policy adoption is associated with 23 per cent and 18 per cent fewer
housing approvals.
Moving on to the FGLS-HAR1 model, a one per cent increase in prices is
associated with a 4 per cent increase in housing approvals. A one point increase
in construction costs and the cash rate significantly decrease new housing
approvals by 3 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively. As in other specifications,
larger cities permit significantly more units than smaller cities. Again, strong
adopters of both EP and IP approve significantly less housing units, as a one unit
increase in EP or IP is associated with 24 per cent and 18 per cent fewer
approvals. As with estimation of equations (1) and (2), the FGLS-HPSAR1
specification yields comparable results to the FGLS-HAR1 model.
4.2 Discussion
Overall, the results paint a clearer picture of housing supply elasticities and
metropolitan growth policies in Australia than previously available. In contrast to
studies by Abelson et al. (2005) and Berger-Thompson and Ellis (2004), we find
housing supply is indeed elastic. Our estimates suggest supply elasticity in Australia is approximately 3.9 to 5.8 over 5 quarters. While this indicates an elastic
housing market, there are few empirical benchmarks to compare these results.
Existing estimates of housing supply elasticities using the Mayer-Somerville
model are from the US, where supply elasticity is much greater and in the order
of 18 per cent for nationally aggregated data, while Mayer and Somerville
(2000b) find elasticity to be around 15 per cent for metropolitan areas. The
results from our model are more closely aligned to Zabel and Patterson‟s (2006)
estimates for California cities, where a 1 per cent increase in housing prices leads
to a 3.1 per cent increase in new housing permits over 8 quarters.
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Table 5. Housing Approval Regression Results: Equation 3

Estimates

PFGLS

FGLSHAR1

FGLSHPSAR1

ln(∆Pricet-1)

1.322
(2.56)

0.681
(1.97)

0.746
(2.23)

ln(∆Pricet-2)

1.281
(2.42)

0.911
(2.29)

0.941
(2.43)

ln(∆Pricet-3)

1.158
(2.62)

0.857
(2.16)

0.875
(2.27)

ln(∆Pricet-4)

2.081
(2.22)

0.907
(2.29)

0.922
(2.39)

ln(∆Pricet-5)

1.962
(1.54)

0.648
(1.84)

0.621
(1.82)

Construction Costs

-0.022
(1.28)

-0.027
(4.37)

-0.020
(3.16)

Cash Rate

-0.306
(1.82)

-0.377
(5.21)

-0.305
(4.07)

Population

0.000
(3.69)

0.000
(7.67)

0.000
(8.56)

Established Policies (EP)

-0.230
(2.00)

-0.248
(4.85)

-0.331
(6.59)

Innovative Policies (IP)

-0.184
(4.21)

-0.183
(6.49)

-0.214
(6.87)

Observations
Prob > chi2
AR(1) Rho

285
0.001
-

285
0.000
0.859

285
0.000
-

Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of quarterly housing approvals. Coefficients
on quarterly dummies not shown – full results are available upon request from the author;
absolute values of z-scores are shown in parentheses below coefficients. Italicized, bold,
and bold italicized represent significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.

Furthermore, interest rates have a rather large impact on new housing
approvals. A typical RBA cash rate increase of 0.25 per cent would lead to a 7.510.75 per cent decrease in new housing approvals. Note that this effect is in
addition to the decrease in housing demand that results from individual mortgage
payments increases, which is captured by the price change variables.
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Of importance in this paper are the estimated effects of metropolitan growth
policies. The results show that a one unit increase in the strength of metropolitan
growth policies reduces new supply by approximately 16 per cent. These
findings are not dissimilar from Mayer and Somerville‟s (2000b) estimates of
growth management policy adoption in the US, where an additional growth
management policy decreases new housing permits by approximately 7 per cent.
Furthermore, the impact of metropolitan growth policy adoption seems to be
about 30 per cent greater for established growth policies, rather than new
innovative policies. Both types of growth policies decrease new housing
approvals, with established and innovative policies lowering new supply by 25
per cent and 18 per cent, respectively. While both negative, the greater
magnitude effect of established policies does support Hamnett and Kellett‟s
(2007) claim that the newer “innovative” policies were supply oriented. Still, the
cumulative impact of such policies is correlated with fewer new housing
approvals.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a theoretical and empirical model of housing supply in
Australia, and uses quarterly data for the five primary capital cities to estimate
supply elasticity and effects of metropolitan growth policies on new housing
approvals from 1996-2010. In contrast to other housing supply studies in
Australia, the UK, and US, we find that housing supply is indeed elastic,
although elasticities in Australia appear to be on the order of 70-80 per cent less
than similar studies conducted in the US, and adjustment periods approximately
0-2 quarters longer.
We also find significant effects from strong implementation of metropolitan
growth policies. Cumulatively, it appears that stronger adopters of such policies
approve less new houses than weaker adopters, controlling for changes in prices,
construction costs, interest rates, and population. Furthermore, it appears that the
effects are about 30 per cent greater for “established” growth policies, such as
urban growth boundaries and urban consolidation, than for newer innovations
like land supply monitoring and strategic planning. While these measures of
growth policies are rudimentary at best, they are an intriguing first glimpse at the
empirical effects of strong land use regulation in Australia.
So what do these results imply about the Australian housing market? Is
Australia‟s recent and substantial rise in housing prices resultant of supply
restrictions? While not absolute, our findings indicate that price increases may
stem from more than just changes in economic fundamentals. This is supported
by the relatively low supply elasticity compared to the US housing market.
While Mayer and Somerville (2000b) also find that supply adjusts to price
changes after 5 quarters, the magnitude is three to five times the supply response
rate in Australia. This could be due to a combination of factors. First, land
developers could be restricting supply in monopolistic tendencies to drive up
prices. While little empirical evidence exists on the matter, this has been
championed as a major justification for the use of public land agencies to
improve supply and increase affordability. On the other hand, not all
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development occurs at the urban fringe, where developers typically land bank. It
also occurs on redeveloped land, within urban areas. Rather, supply restrictions
could result from local NIMBYist resistance and local council downzoning of
existing land. This factor is equally as plausible, as recent metropolitan growth
policies have focused on encouraging infill development within existing urban
centres. Our results also support the latter possibility, as we find stronger
adopters of metropolitan growth policies provide less new housing than weaker
adopters. More intensive local backlash could arise in metropolitan areas that
encourage infill projects, as is exemplified by the emergence of NIMBY groups
like Save our Suburbs in Melbourne.
As with any empirical analysis, there are a number of caveats that arise from
the results. First, we judge the supply elasticity estimates to be low compared to
the US. This benchmark comes from the only other known country where the
Mayer-Somerville model has been applied. Without a third benchmark, it is
difficult to determine if supply elasticities in Australia are exceptionally small, or
wether elasticities in the US are exceptionally large. Judging by the most recent
oversupply of housing in the US, the latter is quite plausible. Second, our
measures of metropolitan growth policies are rudimentary at best. The actual unit
of measurement – strength, as evaluated by Hamnett and Kellett – has no
numerical meaning. Therefore, we cannot confidently estimate the precise
magnitude of adopting stronger growth policies, nor are our findings applicable
to the impact of specific policies themselves. And third, our analysis is
conducted at the metropolitan level, and therefore ignores the heterogeneity of
local council planning policies that may be endogenous to the growth process.
For instance, stronger adopters of new metropolitan planning innovations may do
so in response to a lack of housing supply incurred by restrictive local councils.
Since our measure of such policies is time invariant, we could be misattributing
the effect to innovative policies when indeed they may simply have been enacted
because of existing low housing supply.
In response, we lay out a number of items in need of future research. In order
to better evaluate supply elasticities, there needs to be more international
research on housing supply using the stock-flow adjustment approach so that
better relative comparisons can be made. Second, more detailed analyses of
metropolitan growth policies, their goals, and implementation dates is needed so
that changes in policy adoption can be used as natural experiments. This way,
growth policies can be evaluated over time and space. And last, a comprehensive
analysis of local council planning policies and outcomes are needed to properly
control for potential endogenous effects of metropolitan policies. Despite these
caveats, our results do suggest that low elasticity – whatever their cause – may
have played a role in Australia‟s house price escalation over the past 15 years.
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